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Summary
Grattan Institute’s working paper, Fiscal Challenges for Australia, 
published in July 2015, shows how Commonwealth and state 
government budgets are under pressure. The Commonwealth 
Government has run deficits for six years, largely because its 
spending on older households has increased rapidly.  
State government spending on health and education and other 
vital areas is also growing faster than GDP. State revenues are 
threatened by the Commonwealth’s decision in the 2014-15 
Budget to ease some of its own budget pressures by substantially 
reducing promised funding to the states for hospitals and schools. 
Recent state government budgets provide no insight into how they 
will respond to the looming funding gap.  
In a series of papers over the next two months, Grattan Institute 
will set out four priority reforms for repairing Commonwealth and 
state revenues. This paper shows how a broad-based property 
levy could help repair state government revenues without 
damaging the economy or the most vulnerable in our society. 
Property taxes – which are levied on the value of property 
holdings – are the most efficient taxes available to the states. If 
they are designed well and applied broadly, property taxes do little 
to change incentives to work, save and invest. Unlike capital, 
property is immobile – it cannot shift offshore to avoid higher 
taxes. Concerns about the risks of multinational tax avoidance, 
the increasing mobility of capital around the world, and the 
increasing value of residential property relative to incomes, should 
make property taxes a priority in any tax reform. 
The property tax base is large and growing fast. A low-rate, broad 
based property levy using the council rates base could raise about 
$7 billion a year for state and territory governments through an 
annual levy of just $2 for every $1000 of unimproved land value, 
or $1 for every $1000 of capital improved property value.  
The costs to property owners would be manageable. A 
homeowner would pay a levy of $772 a year on the median-priced 
Sydney home, valued at $772,000, or $560 a year on the median-
priced Melbourne home valued at $560,000. People with low 
incomes and no wealth would pay nothing. Low-income retirees 
with high value houses could defer paying the levy until their 
house is sold. 
Higher property taxes could also be used to fund the reduction 
and eventual abolition of state stamp duties on property. Stamp 
duties are among the most inefficient and inequitable taxes 
available to states, and their revenues are inherently volatile. 
Although abolishing stamp duties is not the focus of this report, 
shifting from stamp duty to a broad-based property tax would 
provide a more stable tax base for states, spread the tax burden 
more fairly, and add up to $9 billion annually to GDP.  
Calls to reform property taxes are not new. Property taxes are 
often unpopular precisely because they are highly visible and 
difficult to avoid. Yet they are also efficient and fair, and don’t 
distort behaviour. Greater use of property taxes would be the best 
way for state governments to meet the growing pressures on their 
budgets. 
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1 State government budgets face growing pressures
The Commonwealth is not the only government under significant 
budgetary pressure. Grattan Institute’s Fiscal Challenges for 
Australia report, published in July 2015, shows that all state 
governments face growing budget pressures beyond the four-year 
forward estimates.  
State government spending on health and education and other 
vital areas is growing faster than GDP. Most states significantly 
increased infrastructure spending over the last few years, and 
largely funded this through borrowing, so that future budgets must 
spend more to service the debt and depreciation.  
Other pressures are threatening state revenues. Relatively 
constant revenues over the last decade may have masked 
increased vulnerabilities in individual revenue sources. In 
particular, untied revenues from the GST fell over the decade.1 
These falls were offset by rises in mining royalties and small 
increases in property and payroll taxes. Yet state royalties are 
now falling as commodity price falls outweigh volume increases.2 
As a result of GST distributions, all states effectively benefited 
from the rise in royalties, and all will suffer if they fall.  
State revenues are also threatened because the Commonwealth 
has eased some of its own budget pressures by substantially 
reducing promised transfers to the states for hospitals and 
schools. The Commonwealth’s decision to no longer contribute to 
growth in real spending per person in these areas beyond 2017-
                                            
1 Daley and Wood (2015), p.19 
2 State royalties are typically value-based; they are not simply charges based on 
volume. 
18 presents the states with a potential $16 billion revenue shortfall 
by 2024-25, and a big problem.3 If spending per person continues 
to grow faster than inflation, then it is unlikely that other areas can 
be cut enough to make up the difference.  
Recent budgets provide no insight into how state governments 
will respond to the looming funding gap. Most have shown a lack 
of enthusiasm for new revenue measures or substantive tax 
reforms.4  
Hoping for the best is not a budget management strategy: it 
simply shifts the costs and risk of budget repair onto future 
generations. More active policy measures to achieve budget 
repair are required. While containing spending will be important, 
both the politics of budget repair and the sheer size of the budget 
gap mean that governments are unlikely to be able to restore 
budgets to balance without also boosting revenues. 
Sustainable budgets depend on tough choices, not hope. To 
ensure that future generations do not have to foot the bill for 
today’s inaction, these choices must be made. 
                                            
3 Daley and Wood (2015), p.18 
4 While South Australia has announced the abolition of stamp duties on 
commercial property following the release of a comprehensive discussion paper 
on State Tax Reform (DTF SA (2015)), it hopes to fund this largely through an 
increased share of GST revenues (Government of South Australia (2015b)). 
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2 Property tax reform should be the states’ priority
Greater use of property taxes is the best way for the states to 
meet their budget challenges. Property taxes – which are levied 
on the value of property holdings – are the most efficient taxes 
available to the states. If they are designed well and applied 
broadly, they do little to change incentives to work, save and 
invest. 
The property tax base is large and growing fast. A low rate broad 
property levy using the council rates base could raise about 
$7 billion a year for state and territory governments through an 
annual levy of just $2 for every $1000 in unimproved land value, 
or $1 for every $1000 in capital improved values. Although it 
would have marginally more impact on economic decisions, a levy 
on capital improved values would still have low economic costs, 
and may be simpler to implement since capital improved property 
values are easier to track. 
A broad-based property levy might provide a path to longer-term 
reform of taxation on property, by funding the reduction and 
eventual abolition of state stamp duties for property. The 
Commonwealth Treasury nominates stamp duty as Australia’s 
least efficient tax.5 Stamp duties deter people from buying and 
selling property, and therefore can prevent them moving closer to 
jobs or upsizing and downsizing homes as their needs change. 
Stamp duties raised $16 billion for the states in 2013-14.6 Their 
costs to the economy and jobs are large. 
                                            
5 Treasury (2015) 
6 ABS (2015b). 
The ACT is phasing out stamp duty over 20 years, and replacing 
the revenues with higher municipal rates.7 South Australia plans 
to abolish stamp duties on commercial property, but has ruled out 
extending land taxes to owner-occupied housing. The government 
seems to be relying on higher GST revenues in order to abolish 
stamp duty, rather than relying more on efficient state taxes.8 
Once a broad-based property levy becomes large enough, it 
might also be possible to phase out land taxes as currently 
designed. The states raised $6.4 billion from land taxes in 2013-
14, but carve outs from the land tax base (via exemptions for 
owner-occupied housing), thresholds, and progressive rates make 
them much less efficient taxes than they should be.  
Property tax reform would also support reforms to the fiscal 
arrangements of the Australian federation. These reforms are 
under consideration through the Commonwealth’s White Paper on 
the Reform of the Federation process. A broad-based property 
levy would boost states’ revenues and give them greater control 
over their own destinies, with minimal drag on their economies. 
Other options to increase revenues include sharing in 
Commonwealth income tax receipts, or broadening or increasing 
the GST. Relative to these options, a broad-based property levy 
would do more to increase state government responsibility for 
funding their own spending.  
                                            
7 Treasury ACT (2012), p.21; Treasury ACT (2014), p.229.  
8 Government of South Australia (2015a); DTF SA (2015). 
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3 Property taxes can generate substantial revenues  
3.1 Australian property taxes are relatively low 
Australian governments derive far less revenue from property 
taxes as a share of GDP than they should. Australia’s property tax 
take is far below that of some comparable countries (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Some countries raise more from property taxes than 
Australia does 
Tax revenues from property as a percentage of GDP, 2012 
Note: Immobile property includes both land and buildings; recurrent taxes on immovable 
property includes taxes levied regularly in respect to use or ownership of immovable 
property, and excludes transaction taxes on property such as stamp duty.  
Source: OECD (2014); Grattan analysis. 
3.2 The property tax base is large and growing fast 
Property is potentially a very large tax base, worth $8.3 trillion in 
June 2014. All Australian land was valued at $4.3 trillion, and 
buildings and other improvements to land are worth $4 trillion, 
with residential land and improvements worth about two-thirds of 
the total (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Australian property values grew quickly this past decade 
Real market value of Australian property, $2014, trillions 
 
Notes: ‘Residential improvements’ consists of the value of the stock of dwelling 
construction, ‘Non-residential improvements’ consists of non-dwelling construction; 
historical figures are inflated by the Consumer Price Index to $2014.  
Source: ABS (2014b); ABS (2014d); Grattan analysis. 
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Figure 3: Property taxes are one of the few ‘growth taxes’  
Percentage change in tax revenue for each 10 per cent increase in 
national GDP, 1990-91 to 2013-14, per cent 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place since 
1990-91; GST is for the period since its introduction in 2000-01 to 2013-14. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); Grattan analysis. 
Land values tend to rise at least as fast as GDP. Over the past 25 
years land values almost tripled, growing much faster than GDP 
(Figure 2).9  Over the last 25 years, property taxes grew faster 
                                            
9 RBA (2014), p.6 
than other state taxes, and faster than the GST since it was 
introduced in 2000 (Figure 3).10  
Over the longer term, property values are likely to keep rising, 
even if the pace of growth is slower than over the past two 
decades. Some of the growth over the last two decades resulted 
from the long-term decline in interest rates. In future, property 
values, and therefore revenues from property taxes, may grow 
more slowly.11 In the long run, property prices are likely to at least 
keep pace with incomes, and may well rise faster, depending on 
population growth, household size and whether supply of new 
properties keeps pace with the growth in demand.12  
Revenues from property taxes tend to be less volatile than stamp 
duties on property sales (Figure 4). State Treasurers dislike 
volatility because it makes budgeting more complex. Volatility in 
property tax revenues can be reduced by levying taxes on the 
average of recent property valuations.13 
 
                                            
10 For more detailed analysis of historical trends in individual state tax revenue 
growth and revenue volatility, see Appendix A. 
11 RBA (2014), p.7  
12 Ibid. p.6  
13 Some states already use this approach to smooth land taxes and council 
rates. 
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Figure 4: A broad based property tax would generate more stable 
revenues than other property taxes 
Standard deviation between annual revenue growth and long run 
average growth in Australia, (1990-91 to 2013-14), per cent 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place since 
1990-91; GST is for the period 2000-01 to 2013-14 only, but displays similar volatility 
compared to state taxes assessed over this shorter period.  
Source: ABS (multiple years); Grattan analysis.  
3.3 Potential revenue from a broad-based property levy  
A levy applied to the existing council rates base would generate 
substantial extra revenues for states. A relatively modest property 
levy, charged at a rate of $2 for every $1000 of unimproved land 
value, could raise about $7 billion a year from 2015-16 (Figure 5). 
A similar amount would be raised by a property levy charged at $1 
for every $1000 of capital improved property value. 14 In 
comparison, state land taxes raised $6.4 billion in 2013-14.15  
Figure 5: A property-based levy could generate significant 
revenues from a modest rate 
Forecast annual levy revenue and 2013-14 actual collections, $ billions 
 
Notes: Property levy revenue forecasts are for 2015-16, whereas land tax, council rates, 
and stamp duty revenues reflect 2013-14 collections. ABS land values for each state in the 
national accounts may differ, albeit not materially, from state Valuer-General figures due to 
different approaches, especially for residential land: see ABS (2014c), p. 419. 
Source: ABS (2014b); ABS (2014e); ATO (2014); Grattan analysis.  
                                            
14 Capital improvements on land are investments made which increase the value 
of the property, particularly buildings, as well as drainage and other works. In this 
report, the term ‘improved value’ is used to refer to any land value definition that 
includes the value of improvements when assessing the value of a property. 
15 ABS (2015b). 
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However, the property levy would reduce Commonwealth 
revenues by about $0.5 billion, since property investors and firms 
would deduct the levy as an expense against their incomes.16 
3.4 GST redistribution due to a property levy would not 
excessively reduce any state’s revenue 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) distributes GST 
revenues among the states to achieve what is known as 
horizontal fiscal equalisation. The goal is to enable each state to 
deliver the same level of government services and infrastructure 
to its residents as other states.17 The CGC assesses the funds 
that each state would need to spend to provide the average level 
of services and the revenue each state would collect if it applied 
the average tax settings of all states. Each state then receives 
GST revenues to fill the gap, after accounting for other transfers it 
receives from the Commonwealth.  
When state governments lift their spending, it usually alters the 
redistribution of GST revenues. Increases in state government 
spending, however funded, tend to shift GST revenues towards 
those states and territories, such as Queensland, SA, Tasmania 
and the NT, where it costs more to deliver services because 
populations are more remote or tend to use more public 
services.18 As a result, when total spending increases across all 
states, net donors such as New South Wales and Victoria tend to 
receive a smaller share of GST revenues, while the share of the 
smaller states and territories grows. The precise GST impacts 
depend upon how states allocate their additional spending. 
                                            
16 Grattan analysis of ABS (2013); ATO (multiple years); ABS (2014e) 
17 Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015a), p.1 
18 For example, hospital services are used more intensively by some age groups 
and by indigenous people. 
GST distributions would be altered if states raised revenues 
through a property levy. If all States implement a property levy, 
then NSW, Victoria, and WA would in effect give up some of their 
revenues through GST redistribution, while other states and 
territories would receive additional GST revenues. This 
redistribution reflects how property levies would raise more per 
person in NSW, Victoria and WA, as the value of property in these 
states is higher.  
However, for a given scale of expenditure (and therefore 
revenue), a property levy would result in relatively less extreme 
GST redistribution than other state taxes, as Figure 6 shows. A 
property levy would distribute less GST money away from NSW 
than an increase in stamp duties would. Victoria would give up 
about the same percentage of new revenue, whether it raised the 
revenue through a property levy or through land taxes. Relative to 
increases in either land or payroll tax, a property levy would 
distribute much less GST money away from WA.  
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Figure 6: A property levy generates less extreme GST redistribution 
than other major state taxes 
GST redistribution as a percentage of revenue raised, 2015-16, per cent 
 
Note: Assumes all states introduce the property levy; excludes any expenditure side 
impacts on GST revenues from states spending any extra revenues raised  
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015b); Grattan analysis. 
For all states, the GST amounts redistributed would be small 
relative to the amount collected by a property levy. Figure 7 
shows the combined effect on GST redistributions of increased 
spending (assuming current spending patterns), funded by a 
property levy imposed by all states. NSW and Victoria, with low 
service delivery costs and high property values, could lose at 
most 15 per cent of the revenues they raise via the levy to other 
states. These extra revenues would mostly flow to Queensland, 
Tasmania, and the NT. 
Figure 7: A property levy would raise slightly more per person in 
NSW and Victoria, but CGC redistribution would lead to similar 
outcomes in all States 
Simulated per capita annual property levy revenue, GST redistribution 
and net revenue impact, 2015-16, $ per capita 
 
Note: Assumes a levy of 0.2 per cent applied uniformly to unimproved land values in each 
state and territory; levy is fully captured by the CGC’s methodology, and applied in 2015-
16; states spend the revenues proportionate to their current expenditures; CGC assesses 
property levy revenues separately from state land taxes (if property levy revenues are 
incorporated into existing land tax assessment, this could have flow on impacts by altering 
the assessed land tax base). Source: ABS (2014a); ABS (2014b); Commonwealth Grants 
Commission (2015b); Grattan analysis. 
 
Because of the CGC’s methodology, GST impacts would be much 
smaller if only one state or a subset of states introduced the levy. 
For example, if NSW alone funded higher spending via the levy, it 
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property levy revenues were used to fund the abolition of state 
stamp duties in a revenue neutral way, the GST impacts would be 
even smaller. NSW would replace one tax where it can raise more 
revenue per head (stamp duty) with another (property levy), while 
there would be no redistribution that reflected higher spending.   
State tax policy changes normally have a delayed effect on GST 
distributions. The 2015-16 GST distributions, for example, are 
based on data from the 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 financial 
years. A state property levy introduced in 2015-16 would not 
begin to affect GST distributions until 2017-18, and the full impact 
would only be incorporated in 2019-2020.  
However, if all states introduce the levy, the CGC may instead 
treat the new levy as if it had been in place for all of the three 
years of historical data used by the CGC. The CGC used this 
approach in 2006 when the states agreed to abolish certain state 
taxes.19  
 
                                            
19 Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015b), p.23 
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4 Property taxes are relatively efficient 
Property taxes – which are levied on the value of property 
holdings – are the most efficient taxes available to the states. 
Governments that want to increase the amount of revenue they 
raise will harm growth less with property taxes than with most 
other taxes. Unlike capital, property is immobile – it cannot shift 
offshore to avoid higher taxes. The risks of multinational tax 
avoidance, the increasing mobility of capital, and the increasing 
value of residential property relative to incomes, should make 
property taxes a priority in any tax reform. 
4.1 Broad-based land taxes are the most efficient taxes  
All taxes drag on economic growth. But some taxes do so less 
than others (Box 1). Broad land taxes are the most economically 
efficient taxes because they do not discourage working or 
investing. Unlike capital or labour, the supply of land is fixed. 
Someone must use the land: it cannot be moved away.  
Land taxes do not distort decisions about land use, provided they 
apply in a way that the landowner can’t avoid.20 For example, a 
constant rate land tax applied to the unimproved value of all land 
prevents landowners from reducing their liability to such a tax by 
changing how they use their land. An empty block of land would 
pay the same tax even after it was developed.  
Broad-based land taxes are much more efficient than stamp 
duties (Box 1). Given estimates of the inefficiency costs of stamp 
duties, abolishing stamp duties in all states and replacing them 
with a broad-based land tax could add $9 billion a year to GDP.21 
                                            
20 Treasury (2010), p.247 
21 Grattan analysis of KPMG Econotech (2011) and ABS (2015b). 
Land is typically valued in its unimproved state.22 The unimproved 
value of a parcel of land does not include the value of 
improvements, such as the construction of buildings on it. Instead, 
it depends on the most valuable use of the land that would 
generate the highest return – as residential housing, farmland, an 
office tower, an industrial site, and so on – subject to the land 
uses permitted under planning laws.23 
Economic theory predicts that a tax on unimproved values – 
applied equally to all land – would result in land prices being lower 
than otherwise.24 Yet rents should remain constant as the land tax 
doesn’t affect how land is used (see Section 7.1).25  
Land taxes can also capture some of the value created by public 
investment such as transport infrastructure. These gains are 
today taxed very lightly. Owner occupied housing is exempt from 
the two taxes that would capture some of the value of these gains: 
capital gains tax and land tax.  
                                            
22 In this working paper, the term ‘unimproved value’ is used to capture a range 
of land value definitions, such as unimproved value, and site value, among 
others. Although there are differences in the definitions, they all capture the 
value of land separate from the value of major capital improvements, such as 
buildings. For example, see Hefferan and Boyd (2010), p.153 
23 Land use restrictions tend to reduce land values where they prevent land 
being used for its’ first and best use. For example, Kulish, et al. (2011) find that 
residential building height restrictions result in lower land prices closer to the 
CBD where the height restriction is binding (p.11). However land use restrictions 
also tend to increase land values for land approved for certain uses by 
increasing the scarcity of that type of land. See Brueckner (2007) for a 
theoretical overview of the impact of land usage policies on land prices.  
24 Land taxes are capitalised into land values (Treasury (2010), p.247). 
25 Ibid., p.248 
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Box 1: Taxes and economic growth   
All taxes reduce growth because they distort decision making by 
households and firms. 
Taxes influence household decisions about how much to save 
and spend, how many hours to work and what to invest in. 
Similarly, taxes affect the decisions of companies about how 
much and what to produce, how much labour and capital to 
employ and where to locate.  
Welfare is reduced when people and firms make decisions 
different to the ones they would have made if taxes were not in 
place. This is measurable as a loss in economic output.  Taxes 
also generate an administrative burden and encourage people to 
expend effort trying to avoid them. The diversion of resources to 
these unproductive activities reduces economic growth.  
But some taxes drag on growth more than others. As a general 
rule, taxes on more mobile assets such as foreign financial 
capital are more likely to change behaviour and therefore harm 
growth compared to the taxation of less mobile assets such as 
land. Taxes on transactions, such as stamp duties, are 
particularly inefficient taxes. They distort the decision to buy and 
sell assets and so distort the optimal allocation of resources.  
Economic models have been used to estimate the loss of 
efficiency from a range of taxes. Figure 8 shows the estimated 
loss of economic activity, or marginal excess burden, from each 
dollar increase in each tax. 
 
There are potentially sizeable gains to productivity and economic 
growth if governments shift some of the tax burden towards more 
efficient taxes. 
Figure 8: Some taxes drag less on economic growth than others   
Loss of economic activity (cents) for each $ increase in tax 
 
Notes: All marginal excess burden estimates are from KPMG Econotech (2011) other than 
council rates that come from the KPMG modelling for Treasury (2010). These estimates are 
broadly consistent with Treasury estimates which evaluated a smaller range of taxes (Liangue 
Cao et al. (2015)). This more recent work suggests that the economic burden of broad based 
land taxes may be even lower, with a marginal excess burden of negative 10 cents, since the 
revenue from foreign owners of land would exceed the economic costs imposed on Australian 
residents 
Source: Treasury (2010); KPMG Econotech (2011) 
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Property prices in major Australian cities have risen faster in 
suburbs closer to the CBD than in those located further out, which 
mainly reflects increases in the price of land, not what has been 
built on it.26 Faster growth in land values in inner-city locations in 
Australian cities reflect, in part, the value of public transport, 
government-funded schools, parks and other public amenities, as 
well as proximity to employment opportunities.27  
4.2 Property taxes at low rates are a little less efficient than 
taxes on land, but are still attractive 
Although they are less efficient than land taxes, property taxes - 
which include the value of capital improvements such as buildings 
- are still very efficient taxes. An OECD report found that reducing 
income taxes by 1 per cent of GDP, and increasing taxes on 
immobile property (both land and buildings) by the same rate 
would improve long run GDP per head by 2.5 percentage points.28 
Property taxes are a little less efficient than land taxes because 
property taxes also tax the returns on capital invested to improve 
the property. This results in fewer improvements being made to 
land, such as fewer buildings, than would otherwise be the case. 
In the longer term, a portion of the property tax will be passed on 
to property users through higher rents for rental housing or for 
firms leasing premises, for example. The effect will flow on to 
other prices. 
4.3 Economic costs are particularly small with low tax rates  
Under the low property tax rate we propose, any economic costs 
are likely to be very small. The economic costs of a tax tend to be 
                                            
26 Kulish, et al. (2011), p.22 
27 Kelly and Donegan (2015), p.87  
28 Johansson, et al. (2008), p.58 
much lower for low tax rates.29 On plausible assumptions, a 
property tax of 0.1 per cent of property value would tax the return 
on capital improvements at about 0.8 per cent.30 To put this in 
context, a landlord doing capital improvements of $100,000 would 
need to collect a mere $8 extra a month in rent to recoup the 
costs of the tax.31 
Unlike many other forms of capital investment, which can move to 
avoid higher taxes, most existing capital improvements to land, 
such as buildings, cannot be moved. Therefore taxing 
improvements on land would be unlikely to affect the existing 
stock of capital improvements. Along with the low tax rate we 
propose, this means that the effect of a property tax on new 
capital invested would be modest, as Box 2 illustrates.   
While there are no estimates from Australia, several overseas 
studies have found that property taxes have relatively low 
economic costs. A survey of US property taxes found that every 
dollar collected reduced economic output by just six to 16 cents. 
On these estimates, property taxes are efficient relative to other 
state taxes such as payroll tax and stamp duty, as Figure 8 
shows. Since taxes tend to be more efficient when levied at low 
rates, even these estimates overstate the economic costs of a 
proposed property tax of 0.1 per cent of property value – a tax 
rate 16 times smaller than those investigated in the US studies.32
                                            
29 See KPMG Econtech (2010), p.18 
30 Assuming an average nominal pre-tax rate of return on capital of 12 per cent. 
The tax rate on capital improvements would rise to 1.4 per cent for an 
investment with a pre-tax rate of return on capital of only 7 per cent. 
31 This figure is independent of the rental return rate adopted.  
32 The weighted average of U.S. state property taxes in the year 2000 
investigated by these studies is equivalent to an annual tax rate of 1.56 per cent 
of property values. 
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Box 2: A modest property tax has a similar impact on 
property development returns as a land tax  
To understand how a property tax would affect returns on property 
development compared to a land tax, we consider a hypothetical 
investment. 
We compare a property tax of 0.1 per cent on improved value with 
a land tax of 0.2 per cent on unimproved value. These taxes would 
raise about the same revenue each year.  
We consider an investor who buys land intending to develop it by 
investing in new capital improvements. We calculate the rate of 
return on the total investment given various levels of new capital 
improvement. Figure 9 shows that returns are very similar under 
the alternative regimes, even in cases where improvements 
account for most of the property value after redevelopment.  
The differences only become material at much higher rates of tax. 
For example, comparing a property tax rate of 1 per cent to a land 
tax rate of 2 per cent (which would each raise about $70 billion), 
the annual rate of return on new improvements worth twice the 
value of the land would be 0.3 percentage points lower. The 
difference in the rates of return would be greater – about 0.8 
percentage points – for capital investment typical for apartments, 
where the building cost can be 10 times the land value. 
 
Figure 9: A low rate tax on improvements has little impact on returns on 
the total investment 
Annual rates of return after taxes on property for redeveloped property,  
per cent 
 
Notes: Based on a property tax rate of 0.1 per cent, and a land tax rate of 0.2 per cent. Assumes 
a pre-tax rate of return on the total investment of 12 per cent.  
Source: Grattan analysis. 
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5 Legislative basis for property tax reform 
Additional property taxes should build upon existing tax bases. 
State and local governments already levy two types of property 
taxes: land tax and council rates.  
All states and territories except the Northern Territory levy land 
taxes. They base the taxes on the value of the land without capital 
improvements such as buildings.  Land taxes exempt owner-
occupied housing and most agricultural land – more than half of 
all land by value (Figure 2).  
The other property tax base is the municipal rates levied by local 
councils, usually based on improved values. Because very few 
properties are exempt from this tax it is a much better base from 
which to charge a property levy.33 Some States have already 
levied emergency services levies on this municipal rate base. 
5.1 State land taxes are a compromised tax base 
Existing state land taxes generate much less revenue than a 
broader-based land tax would. States raised $6.4 billion from land 
taxes in 2013-14.34 Exempting the family home from land tax 
excludes about 75 per cent of the value of residential land, and 
state government budgets forgo about $5 billion in revenue.35 
                                            
33 Land taxes also usually exempt much Commonwealth and State-owned land, 
and land used by public hospitals, libraries, cemeteries, charities, religious 
organisations, universities, schools and foreign embassies. See Productivity 
Commission (2008), p.105 
34 ABS (2015b). 
35 Treasury (2010), p. 261; Kelly, et al. (2013), p.24. Even though owner 
occupied housing accounts for 75 per cent of all residential land, imposing land 
tax on it would only raise $5 billion as it would be taxed at comparatively low 
rates under the highly progressive rates of land tax currently in force.   
Exemptions for agricultural land remove almost a further 10 per 
cent of land by value from the land tax base (Figure 2).36  
States also apply substantial tax-free thresholds based on total 
landholdings before any tax is levied. These thresholds range 
from $25,000 in Tasmania to $600,000 in Queensland and further 
reduce state revenues from land taxes.37 
Land taxes are also levied on a progressive scale so that people 
with larger land holdings pay a higher rate of land tax per dollar 
value of land owned. Progressive rates reduce the efficiency of 
the ideal land taxes that were discussed in Section 4. They 
discourage larger landholdings and partly explain why small 
investors dominate Australia’s rental housing market, with 
relatively few landlords owning a large number of properties.38 
For example, a small investor with a single investment property in 
Sydney built on land valued at $750,000 pays land tax of $5,508 
in 2014. By comparison, a large investor owning ten such 
properties pays $133,432 in land tax, or $13,343 per property.39  
Land tax exemptions also make the system more difficult to 
administer and for landowners to comply with.40 Tax-free 
thresholds and progressive rate structures provide landowners 
with incentives to break up their land holdings and adopt complex 
ownership structures in order to reduce their land tax payments. 
                                            
36 Treasury (2010), p.260 
37 Treasury NSW (2014), pp.31-33 
38 See Berry (2000); Wood, et al. (2010); Treasury (2010) p.261  
39 Treasury NSW (2014), pp.31-33 
40 Treasury (2010), p.261 
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Time and resources spent by firms to manage more complex 
structures are a burden on productivity.41 Tax authorities use 
grouping provisions to overcome incentives to fragment land 
holdings, but impose additional costs in administering them.  
Exempting owner-occupied housing is also very regressive. The 
exemption for the family home benefits households in the top 
income quintile by almost $2000, but benefits households in the 
bottom income quintile by just $400.42 
State land taxes could be an efficient tax base provided that 
exemptions, thresholds and progressive tax rates were abolished. 
Yet extending the existing land tax base to cover owner occupied 
residential property and agricultural land would be politically 
difficult, and is likely to be portrayed as favouring businesses at 
the expense of consumers. 
Similarly, removing tax free thresholds and shifting to a single flat 
land tax rate assessed at the property level would result in much 
lower tax liabilities for large landholders. Again, such a reform 
could well be portrayed as unfair: favouring a small number of 
wealthy landlords while increasing land tax liabilities for smaller 
landholders.  
5.2 Council rates are a better taxation base than state land 
taxes.  
Local councils levy rates on the value of unimproved land, and in 
some states, on capital improved values. Rates are applied to all 
properties within a council area with few exemptions. There are 
no exemptions for owner-occupied housing or agricultural land 
                                            
41 Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998), p.157 
42 Kelly, et al. (2013), p.27 
and constant rates apply from the first dollar of property value with 
no minimum threshold. The largest exemption from council rates 
is for some non-profit, non-government organisations such as 
charities, schools and public hospitals.43 
Council rates are levied at the same rate per dollar of land value 
of a property, regardless of the overall size of ratepayers’ total 
property holdings, and so do not discriminate against large 
property investors.44 
Municipal rates regimes vary across councils. Councils may levy a 
fixed charge, a variable rate based on property values, or a 
combination of the two. In some states, councils determine the tax 
base for rates by choosing between measures of unimproved or 
capital improved property values (Table 1).45 Despite these 
differences, a state government levy added to council rates would 
be relatively simple to administer. In practice a government could 
set a state-wide rate, with the council rate as an additional charge 
that varies by council. 
                                            
43 For example, the City of Gosnells estimated the value of the rates revenue 
foregone by WA councils from exemptions to charities in WA at $6.5 million, or 
0.7 per cent of total state-wide council rates revenue for 2005-06. See 
Productivity Commission (2008), p.107 
44 In Victoria, for example, most councils determine rates on the basis of the 
assessed capital value of the property. See Hefferan and Boyd (2010), p.154 
45 Productivity Commission (2008), p.198 
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Table 1: Approaches to valuing properties for council rates vary  
Property value bases that can be used to set council rates in each state 
State Basis for council rates  
NSW Unimproved   
QLD Unimproved   
VIC Either unimproved or capital improved  
WA Capital improved  
SA Either unimproved or capital improved 
TAS Either unimproved or capital improved  
NT Unimproved   
ACT Unimproved   
Notes: ‘Unimproved’ refers to a set of land valuations that capture the value of the land 
only. ‘Capital improved’ refers to valuations that capture the value of the land and 
significant capital improvements made to that land, such as buildings.  
Sources: Productivity Commission (2008); Mangioni and Warren (2014); Treasury NSW 
(2014). 
There are no constitutional barriers to states adopting the council 
rates base to raise revenues. Although councils set and often 
collect rates, they are ultimately levied under the authority of state 
government legislation.  
Table 2: Property-based emergency services levies are a template 
for property tax reform 
Structure of state property-based emergency services levies 
State Property value used 
 Levy structure Collection authority 
 Land 
only 
Land and 
buildings 
 Fixed 
charge 
Variable 
rate
  
VIC !      Councils 
WA rural  !     Councils 
WA metro !      Councils 
SA !     State govt. 
ACT  !  !  State govt. 
Notes: The ACT funds fire services via a levy based on unimproved property values for 
commercial property only, with a fixed charge for residential and rural land. The ACT also 
uses the average of unimproved land values over the past 3 years; WA sets minimum 
charges for the total levy collected on each property, which act as a de facto fixed charge 
for some ratepayers. Sources: Government of Victoria (2014); Revenue SA (2015); Rates 
Act (ACT) (2004); Government of Western Australia (2015). 
Governments in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and 
the ACT already use the council rates base for state-wide 
property-based levies to fund fire and emergency services. These 
levies provide a template for reform. They are charged as a share 
of land or property values. The levy rates are set at the state level. 
In Victoria and Western Australia (but not South Australia), 
notices of liability are issued as part of council rates notices, and 
levies are collected by councils and passed on to state 
governments (Table 2). Over time a large state property levy 
might lead to centralised collection of both property levy and 
council rates through state revenue offices. 
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6 Key design choices for a property levy 
A modest levy on property values could generate significant 
revenues for states and territories, with less drag on economic 
activity than other available state taxes. 
6.1 A flat rate levy on property values, with no fixed charge, 
is the simplest approach 
The levy could be designed in a number of ways. A flat tax rate on 
property values would be the simplest. The levy would consist of a 
flat rate charged per dollar of property value, with no fixed charge 
per property. It would apply equally to all land, regardless of land 
use, and from the first dollar of property value with no minimum 
threshold. It would be assessed separately on each property 
owned, as currently occurs with council rates, using existing 
Valuer-General valuations.  
A flat rate with no fixed charge would be more equitable than 
council rates and the existing state emergency services levies 
which both include a fixed or minimum charge. These reflect the 
fee-for-service implicit in charges for council services and 
emergency services. Yet these levies are inherently regressive as 
they fall more heavily on the less well off.46 A state property levy 
aimed at raising general revenue should have no fixed charge. 
Recent Commonwealth and state tax reviews have considered 
levying land tax with higher tax rates for land with a higher value 
                                            
46 Productivity Commission (2008) notes that ‘other things equal, imposing a 
minimum (or fixed) charge makes rates regressive (or less progressive) than 
otherwise’ (p.139). 
per square metre.47 Yet the problems with progressive rates 
probably outweigh the benefits. 
On the plus side, a progressive rate structure captures more of 
the spill-over benefits of public investments in infrastructure, such 
as transport infrastructure, parks, schools, and libraries that 
increase nearby property values. Higher taxes on vacant property 
in expensive inner-city locations might also speed development as 
higher property taxes increase holding costs.48 A progressive tax 
rate would also be popular with politically powerful farming 
lobbies, since most farmland would be taxed at a low rate. 
The progressive rate also reflects – albeit very approximately – 
the progressive nature of state stamp duties. If a property levy 
aims not only to raise additional revenue but to replace existing 
stamp duties, a progressive rate on the levy might provide less of 
a bonus to the owners of highly priced properties that currently 
incur high stamp duties when purchased. 
However, a progressive rate property levy would still lead to 
different tax treatments for properties that at present incur the 
same stamp duty. For example, with tax calculated on the price of 
land per square metre, the owners of small inner city apartments 
would pay much more than they do under the replaced stamp 
duties. The owners of similarly priced outer suburban houses 
would pay much less.  
                                            
47 Treasury (2010), p.265; Government of South Australia (2015c) p.41 
48 Wood, et al. (2012). 
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To the extent that a property levy is a tax on wealth, a levy 
charged at a progressive rate would treat people with similar 
wealth differently.  
An increasing marginal tax rate based on the value of land per 
square metre would make a property levy more complex to 
administer. It would require more accurate and reliable land 
valuations since higher levy rates would compound any errors in 
the land valuation process.  
A progressive tax rate should only be applied to unimproved land 
values, as otherwise it would significantly discourage investing in 
improvements. However, a progressive rate compounds the 
administrative complexities of taxing unimproved values: 
unimproved values are hardest to determine accurately where 
land values are highest, and hence the consequences of disputed 
valuations are worth more. 
6.2 A levy rebate would reduce the burden on low wealth 
property holders, but would significantly reduce 
revenue 
Providing an exemption, or rebate, for the first portion of property 
tax liability would make the levy more progressive with respect to 
household wealth.49 Households with lower wealth tend to own 
lower value homes, so the rebate would reduce the average 
property tax rate applied to low wealth property owners.   
However, such a rebate could easily halve the revenue raised 
from the levy. A $500 rebate on a property levy applied to 
unimproved land values would mean that no landowner would pay 
the property levy on landholdings worth less than $250,000. Such 
                                            
49 For example, see Slack and Bird (2014), p.8.  
a rebate would exclude about half of all residential properties in 
NSW, even if property owners could only claim the rebate in 
respect of one property.50  
A rebate would also provide incentives for landowners to fragment 
holdings across different legal entities in order to make use of 
multiple rebates, as currently occurs with state land taxes. 
6.3 The levy should be applied to land values, but a levy on 
capital improved property values is a good alternative 
The property levy could be applied to only the unimproved value 
of land, or to the combined value of land and buildings. Although a 
tax on unimproved value is theoretically better, it increases 
implementation problems, and the practical impacts on investment 
of a levy on capital improved values would be small. 
A levy on unimproved land values is preferable because it does 
not discourage investing in improvements. While many councils 
levy rates on capital improved values, state Valuer-Generals 
maintain comprehensive registers of unimproved land values to 
determine state land tax liabilities.51 A levy on unimproved land 
values could be applied universally, with the levy listed as a 
separate item on ratepayers’ council rates notices. 
A levy on unimproved values would also make it easier to use 
increased levies to replace stamp duties over time. Replacing 
stamp duties would require higher rates of tax – potentially about 
0.4 per cent of unimproved values.  
                                            
50 Based on a property levy 0.2 per cent of unimproved land value, and median 
residential land values supplied by NSW Treasury. 
51 Councils in all states except WA currently have the option to levy rates based 
on land values  (Table 1). 
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While it is less economically efficient, a levy based on property 
values is easier to administer and would be a good alternative. A 
tax on improved values would still be much more efficient than a 
stamp duty, and most other state taxes. Capital improved property 
values are easier to determine since market sales and rental data 
are more readily available. Effective property taxes require up-to-
date, transparent and accurate property valuations. The recent 
shift towards capital improved values for council rates in some 
states reflects difficulties in determining the unimproved value of 
land, especially in dense urban areas where there are few, if any, 
market sales of unimproved land.52  
6.4 An annual charge is simpler than a capitalised charge 
collected on sale  
Some have suggested capitalising the property tax for all 
landowners, and collecting the capitalised charge (potentially 
including accrued interest) only when the property is sold.53 This 
would mimic the political advantages of current stamp duties: they 
are paid less often, and only when the vendor is cashed up from a 
recent sale. Because the amount payable depends on how long 
the vendor has owned the property, a capitalised charge would 
reduce the problems of the current stamp duty regime, which 
discourages more frequent property turnover. 
Yet this design has a number of problems. Above all, it would be 
complex to explain, and therefore unattractive to politicians.  
A capitalised charge would also lead to significant increases in 
state gross debt as governments would collect promises of future 
payment rather than cash, unless interest was charged.  
                                            
52 NSW Ombudsman (2005), p.24; Hefferan and Boyd (2010), p.153 
53 For example, see Slack and Bird (2014), p.8.  
The approach also presents problems similar to those that arise 
with capital gains tax. Unless there is an interest charge on 
accrued tax then the property holder receives an interest free loan 
until the property is sold. The investor has large incentives not to 
sell, which locks people into holding properties – the precise 
problem that makes stamp duties so inefficient.  
6.5 Levy deferral for pensioners: managing the impact for 
income-poor, asset-rich owner occupiers 
However, capitalising the charge may be a good option to 
manage the impact on the relatively small number of income-poor, 
asset-rich owner-occupiers. 
A property levy would pose difficulties for people who are asset-
rich but income-poor, especially retirees who have limited 
incomes but own their own home. Retirees who want to stay in 
their homes should be able to do so. Many are emotionally 
attached to them. They provide continued access to social 
networks, and leaving them often carries large financial and 
emotional costs.  
One option is to provide concessions to property owners with low 
incomes. State governments typically provide rebates on council 
rates to pensioners and other concession cardholders.54 Similar 
concessions also apply in those states that charge property-based 
fire services levies.  
                                            
54 In most cases, states provide a fixed rebate on council rates, and reimburse 
councils for the foregone rates revenues. Many councils also offer an additional 
fixed rebate on municipal rates for pensioners and concession card holders. In 
most cases, property-owning pensioners still have some residual rates liability 
after these concessions are applied. 
Property taxes  
Grattan Institute 2015 21 
Yet exempting or providing concessions to asset-rich, cash-poor 
landowners would be unfair to younger taxpayers. It also ignores 
the substantial resources of some retirees. Concessions based on 
pension eligibility are already poorly targeted: many wealthier 
Australians receive the Age Pension. Of mature age households 
with a million dollars of net assets, about 80 per cent receive 
welfare benefits.55  
A fairer approach would be for state governments to allow asset-
rich, income-poor households to defer paying the levy until they 
sell their property. Deferral arrangements are already available for 
seniors paying council rates in South Australia, Western Australia 
and the ACT (Box 3).56  
The amount could accrue as a debt against the property, with an 
appropriate caveat registered at the Land Title Office. Interest 
should be charged on the balance to reflect the cost of deferral. A 
safety net might be provided by a stipulation that the debt cannot 
account for more than 20 per cent of the value of the property, 
and would be non-recourse.57 This would protect ratepayers from 
longevity risks – where individuals live longer than expected and 
the debt comes to exceed the value of the property as interest 
charges continue to compound over time.  
                                            
55 Daley, et al. (2013b), p.37 
56 Brownfield (2014), p.10 
57 Under a non-recourse loan, the creditor cannot claim any other assets of the 
borrower if the borrower defaults and the collateral is insufficient to repay the 
debt.  
Box 3: The South Australian Postponement of Rates 
Scheme 
The Postponement of Rates Scheme, operated by South 
Australian councils, allows retirees to postpone payment of 
council rates. Similar schemes operate in Western Australia and 
the ACT. The scheme is designed to help elderly ratepayers to 
finance their rates payments by unlocking the value of home 
equity. Such households may own their own homes and are 
therefore asset-rich, but on low incomes. 
Eligible ratepayers can postpone a portion of the rates applied to 
their principal place of residence. Any rates after the first $500 
each year can be postponed. The scheme is only available to 
ratepayers that own their property alone, or with their spouse. 
Ratepayers incur interest on the outstanding debt, which 
compounds monthly. The interest rate is set at the average 
borrowing costs for councils in that year, which was 6 per cent in 
2013-14. Ratepayers receive an update on their postponed rates 
debt, and any accrued interest, as part of their rates notices each 
year. The accrued debt is payable when the property is sold or 
transferred to someone else and no surviving spouse remains 
living in the house.  
To be eligible, a ratepayer must be over 60 years of age and work 
less than 20 hours a week in paid employment. Ratepayers must 
also have at least 50 per cent equity in their property after 
accounting for any outstanding mortgage debt if the mortgage 
was registered before 25 January 2007.  
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In reality, very few retirees would use this safety net. At the tax 
rates proposed, 30 years of deferred levy and the accumulated 
interest would still only be 5 per cent of the property value.58  
Yet the safety net could become more important if the levy rate 
were raised in future - to fund the abolition of stamp duty, for 
example.  
Levy deferral schemes should be statewide since state 
governments would ultimately receive the revenues. A statewide 
scheme could also incorporate existing council rate deferral 
schemes and be extended to state-based emergency services 
levies.59 
 
                                            
58 A 0.1 per cent levy on property value, with payment deferred for 30 years 
would result in a deferred charge equivalent to 4 per cent of the property value, 
including deferred interest. This assumes a 7 per cent nominal interest rate and 
3 per cent annual growth in nominal house prices. With a 10 per cent nominal 
interest rate, the deferred charge would be equivalent to 7 per cent of the 
property value. 
59 State governments typically reimburse councils for the rate revenue foregone 
under council rate deferral programs. 
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7 The levy would not impose unreasonable burdens
7.1 The levy would reduce property values, but would have 
little impact on rents 
An increase in property taxes usually reduces property values, all 
else being equal, with little impact on rents. Potential buyers of 
property will reduce how much they are willing to pay by the future 
cost of property tax payments.60 Therefore the tax liability is 
capitalised into the property value. For example, a 0.2 per cent 
levy on unimproved land values would be expected to reduce land 
values by between 3 and 6 per cent.61  
A levy on unimproved land values would have no impact on rents. 
If a landowner tried to pass on the tax by charging higher rents, 
some people would decide not to rent, thereby lowering rental 
demand and causing rents to fall back again. 
A levy on capital improved property values might lead to small 
rent rises, since it would discourage some investment in new 
improvements and therefore affect the supply of housing. Over 
time, landlords are likely to pass on to renters some of the 
additional costs that the levy imposes on improvements. Yet as 
Figure 9 shows, the impact on rents is likely to be small as the 
levy would have only a very small impact on the returns that 
accrue from investing in new improvements. For example, if a 
                                            
60 There is considerable literature documenting the capitalisation of property 
taxes into land values. For example see Wallace E. Oates and Schwab (2009). 
Wood, et al. (2012) adopt a similar approach to estimate the impact of the Henry 
Review recommendations on land values in Victoria (p.22). 
61 The impact of the tax on land values depends upon the discount rate adopted.  
For example, a property levy would lower land values by 6 per cent with a 
discount rate of 2 per cent, but by only 3 per cent if a 6 per cent discount rate is 
adopted. This analysis assumes a levy of 0.2 per cent on land values only. 
landlord sought to pass through the full cost of the levy after 
investing $500,000 in developing improved land priced at 
$500,000, it would increase the annual rent by 1 per cent, or $10 
a week.62 In reality the impact would be smaller as only a small 
share of the levy would be passed through because new 
improvements are a small share of the total housing stock. 
7.2 Costs for property owners would be manageable 
A homeowner would pay a levy of $772 a year on the median 
Sydney house valued at $772,000, or $560 a year on the median 
Melbourne home valued at $560,000. The average levy burdens 
on households in other major Australian cities would be lower 
(since property prices are lower), and lower still in regional areas 
(Table 3).  
The average burden of the levy on each property owner would be 
smaller than existing council rates for most owners (Figure 10).63 
Property holders with higher incomes would pay more in absolute 
terms than those with lower incomes. Those with higher incomes 
tend to own more valuable homes, and are more likely to own an 
investment property.64 
                                            
62 Rents would rise by 1.3 per cent for a real rental yield (excluding any capital 
gains) of 4 per cent. For a rental yield of 7 per cent, the percentage increase in 
rents drops to 0.7 per cent. Both examples reflect a property levy of 0.1 per cent 
of capital improved property values. 
63 This analysis assumes a levy of 0.2 per cent on land values only. The results 
would be broadly similar for a levy on capital improved property values of around 
0.1 per cent. 
64 Grattan analysis of ABS (2013) 
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Table 3: Costs for property owners would be manageable  
Property levy payable on the average home by capital city, $2015-16 
City Median dwelling price Property levy per year 
Sydney $772,200 $772 
Melbourne $560,000 $560 
Brisbane $455,000 $455
Perth $510,000 $510
Adelaide $405,000 $405
Hobart $315,500 $316
Darwin $515,000 $515 
Canberra $535,000 $535 
Notes: Based on a 0.1 per cent levy on capital improved property values, applied to the 
median prices of homes in major Australian cities, as at June 30, 2015. 
Sources: RP Data Core Logic (2015); Grattan analysis. 
Figure 10: The property levy would be less than council rates for 
most property owners 
Property taxes payable by property owners in each income decile, 
$2011-12 
 
Note: Simulated impact of applying a 0.2 per cent levy to unimproved land values; average 
rates and levy costs are calculated based only on those households within the disposable 
income decile that would pay the levy; households reporting negative household 
disposable income and negative net wealth are excluded from the analysis; council rates 
include all charges, net of rebates, but exclude water charges; deciles are grouped by 
equivalised disposable (i.e. post tax) income of each household.  
Source: ABS (2013); Grattan analysis.   
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7.2.1 Impact on those worst off 
The impact of revenue measures on the poorest households is a 
particular concern.65 While measures of inequality traditionally 
focus on income, material wellbeing depends upon both income 
and accumulated wealth. Assessing taxpayers’ capacity to pay 
should consider the ability of households to draw on their net 
wealth, or generate income from their assets.66 This approach is 
especially important when considering wealth taxes such as a 
property levy. Consequently the distribution of both wealth and 
income are relevant in assessing the impact of a property levy. A 
particular concern is households that are in the bottom 20 per 
cent of the income distribution and have low net worth.67 
A property-based levy would fall largely on households with 
higher net worth, reflecting their greater property holdings (Figure 
11). Households that are both income and asset poor would, on 
average, pay almost no levy. By contrast, households ranked 
among the top 20 per cent by net worth – of at least $640,000 – 
would pay an average of $1933 annually.68 About a quarter of all 
revenues raised by the levy would come from the 7.5 per cent of 
households that are in both the top disposable income quintile 
and top net worth quintile.  
                                            
65 Daley, et al. (2013a), p.21 
66 OECD (2013), p.180 
67 The ABS adopts the concept of household net worth, rather than household 
wealth, in the Survey of Income and Housing. See ABS (2014f), p.19 for a 
detailed discussion on this issue. 
68 The equivalent net worth figure for a two adult household in the top income net 
worth quintile would be $960,000. For a two adult family with two children aged 
under 15, this rises to $1.34 million. Grattan analysis of ABS (2013); ABS 
(2014b) 
Figure 11: A property-based levy would be targeted towards those 
with greater means to pay 
Average levy and total levy paid within each income and net worth 
quintile, $2011-12 
 
Note: 2011-12 dollars; Simulated impact of applying a 0.2 per cent levy to land values only; 
Households that have reported negative household disposable income and negative net 
wealth have been excluded from the analysis; quintiles are grouped by equivalised 
disposable (i.e. post tax) income and net worth of each household.  
Source: ABS (2013); Grattan analysis.   
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of households by wealth would pay about $1250 a year.69 This 
category includes a significant number of retirees.70 The proposed 
levy deferral schemes would support such asset-rich, income-
poor households by allowing them to use their property assets to 
finance the levy. 
The impact of the levy on households with low net worth would be 
minimal (Figure 12). For households in the lowest net worth 
decile, the average levy is equivalent to 0.03 per cent of their net 
worth, or just 30 cents for every $1000 of net worth.71  
Households in the fourth and fifth net worth deciles would pay the 
highest percentage share of their household net worth through the 
levy. There are two reasons why. 
First, many of these middle-wealth households may be young 
homeowners who have recently purchased residential property. 
They are likely to have relatively high levels of gross property 
assets, on which the levy is calculated. Since these assets are 
financed largely by debt, these households would have 
comparatively low net worth, but large levy liabilities.  
Second, while property holdings increase with household net 
worth, property tends to account for a lower share of net worth 
among the wealthy. Instead wealthier households tend to hold a 
greater share of their net worth in financial assets, such as 
equities, bonds and superannuation funds. Since the levy does 
not apply to these assets, these wealthy households on average 
would incur lower levy charges as a share of their net worth.  
                                            
69 Grattan analysis of ABS (2013); ABS (2014b) 
70 For earlier commentary on this issue see Harding and Warren (1999), p.11; 
Productivity Commission (2008), pp.156-158 
71 Grattan analysis of ABS (2013); ABS (2014b) 
Nevertheless, high net worth households may pay more than our 
analysis indicates. Well-off households are more likely to hold 
their residential property assets in trusts, or other legal entities. 
These would pay the levy, but cannot be captured by statistical 
analysis at the household level.  
Figure 12: The burden would be lowest for low wealth households 
Average levy and levy paid as a share of net worth within each net worth 
decile, $2011-12 
 
Note: Simulated impact of applying a 0.2 per cent levy to land values only; excludes 
households that report negative household disposable income or negative net worth; 
deciles grouped by equivalised net worth of each household.  
Source: ABS (2013); Grattan analysis.   
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Appendix: State tax revenue growth and revenue volatility 
Section 3.2 analyses trends in growth in revenues from major 
state taxes, and the volatility of those revenues for the period 
1990-91 to 2013-14, for all states combined. The aggregate 
trends over 25 years were: 
• State property taxes such as land tax and stamp duty grew 
faster than other state taxes; 
• State property taxes revenues were more volatile than other 
state taxes; 
• Our proposed broad-based property levy would have been 
less volatile than other property taxes, especially stamp duty. 
However, trends in state tax revenues varied across states, and 
across different time periods. State-specific economic 
developments affected the growth in state tax bases, and the 
volatility of state tax revenue streams. Meanwhile explicit tax 
policy changes by state governments also affected revenues. 
This appendix breaks down in more detail the trends in revenue 
growth and revenue volatility among major state taxes for the five 
largest states: New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western 
Australia and South Australia. Trends in revenue growth and 
revenue volatility for each of these states are presented over 
three time periods: 1990-91 to 2013-14, 1990-91 to 1999-2000, 
and 2000-01 to 2013-14. Trends in revenue growth and volatility 
for all states combined are also presented for two sub-periods: 
1990-91 to 1999-2000; and 2000-2001 to 2013-14. 
The trends in revenue growth and revenue volatility in individual 
States are generally consistent with the national averages. 
Compared to other property taxes, a broad based property levy 
would have produced faster growing, more stable revenues for 
most states, across most time periods.  
However, there are some exceptions.  
Over the period 2000-01 to 2013-14, stamp duty revenues grew 
slower than Gross State Product (GSP) in New South Wales, 
Queensland and Western Australia (Figure 17). Weaker than 
average property markets in this period caused a significant fall in 
stamp duty revenue for these states over these periods, 
particularly during the Global Financial Crisis.  
In New South Wales, the property market was particularly weak 
between 2002-03 and  2008-09, with a fall in the number of 
property transfers leading to lower revenues from stamp duties on 
conveyances.72 The median price of houses transacted in Sydney 
grew by only 21.4 per cent over this period, while the total number 
of property transfers fell by more than 30 per cent.73  
In Queensland, the state government lifted the exemption 
threshold on stamp duty for first-home buyers from $320,000 to 
$500,000 in 2008-09, eroding the tax base.74 The Queensland 
property market also declined after the Global Financial Crisis. 
The median price of houses transacted in Brisbane fell by an 
                                            
72 Commonwealth Grants Commission (2009), p.18. 
73 Grattan analysis of ABS (2015a) 
74 Treasury and Trade Qld (2014) 
Property taxes  
Grattan Institute 2015 28 
average of 5 per cent between 2008 and 2012, whereas GSP 
increased by 23 per cent over the same period.   
Queensland revenues from a broad-based property levy would 
have grown slower than GSP over the period 1990 to 1999. In this 
period, total land value increased by only 60 per cent, compared 
to the approximately 300 per cent increase in total land value over 
the period 2000 to 2013.75  
In Western Australia, stamp duties fell from 15.4 per cent of state 
revenues in 2005-06 to 10.6 per cent in 2008-09, due to a similar 
decline in the property market.76 The median price of houses 
transacted in Perth fell by 10 per cent between 2008 and 2012, 
whereas GSP rose by 56 per cent over the same period. 
Moreover, the Western Australian State Government doubled the 
exemption threshold on stamp duties for first-home buyers in 
2007-08, lifting the threshold for residential properties to 
$500,000.77 In 2008-09, stamp duties for residential properties 
were also lowered, with a 15 per cent cut to stamp duty on a 
median price house.78  This further eroded the tax base, where 
residential land value accounted for over 75 per cent of total land 
value in Western Australia.  
  
                                            
75 Grattan analysis of ABS (2014b) 
76 Commonwealth Grants Commission (2010), p.13. 
77 Treasury WA (2007) 
78 Treasury WA (2008) 
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Figure 13: Revenues from property taxes grew faster than the 
economy in all states except WA 
Percentage change in tax revenue for a 10 per cent increase in Gross 
State Product, 1990-91 to 2013-14 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis.  
Figure 14: A broad based property levy would generate more stable 
revenues than other property taxes in all states except WA 
Standard deviation between annual revenue growth and long run 
average growth, 1990-91 to 2013-14 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis.  
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Figure 15: Revenue from property taxes grew slower than many 
other taxes between 1990 and 2000  
Percentage change in tax revenue for a 10 per cent increase in Gross 
State Product, 1990-91 to 1999-2000 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis.  
Figure 16: Revenue from property taxes grew faster than many 
other taxes since 2000 
Percentage change in tax revenue for a 10 per cent increase in Gross 
State Product, 2000-01 to 2013-14 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis.  
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Figure 17: A broad-based property levy would have been less 
volatile than other property taxes, and many other taxes between 
1990 and 2000  
Standard deviation between annual revenue growth and long run 
average growth, 1990-91 to 1999-2000 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis.  
Figure 18: A broad-based property levy would have been  
less volatile than other property taxes except in WA  
since 2000 
Standard deviation between annual revenue growth and long run 
average growth, 2000-01 to 2013-14 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis.  
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Figure 19: Unlike most other taxes, a broad-based property levy 
would have grown faster than GDP between 1990 and 2000, and 
between 2000 and 2014 
Percentage change in tax revenue for a 10 per cent increase in national 
GDP, all states 
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis. 
Figure 20: A broad-based property levy would have been less 
volatile than other property taxes between 1990 and 2000, and 
between 2000 and 2014 
Standard deviation between annual revenue growth and long run 
average growth, all states  
 
Note: ‘Property levy’ shows the revenues that would have been raised with a broad-based 
property levy of 0.2 per cent applied to unimproved land values had it been in place over 
the period. 
Source: ABS (multiple years); ABS (2014b);Grattan analysis. 
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